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Achieving full functional safety compliance at a plant will not just happen; it takes a focused 
effort from dedicated personnel and a supporting management staff. It’s a lot of work, but the 
potential safety and reliability benefits are well worth the investment. This paper will walk 
through the steps employed at several sites in Texas and hopes to provide stimulus for others to 
follow suite. 
The first ISA 84 (ISA 84.01-1996) functional safety standard initiated the safety lifecycle; the 
second, internationally adapted version, ISA 84 (ISA 84.00.01-2004) refined the process through 
the Functional Safety Management (FSM) plan and various other vital additions. Each helped 
provide a sturdy framework for an expected sustainable process for the remainder of the subject 
facility’s life and are considered good practices by OSHA for PSM. 
It is fully believed that if done properly, the end result of applying the ISA84 standard to 
complete compliance will be a safer and more cost effectively controlled process environment. 
 1. Functional Safety Management “It’s All in the Plan” 
The first ISA 84 (ISA 84.00.01-2004) objective is to specify safety lifecycle (SLC) management 
and technical activities needed to implement the safety instrumented system. It should designate 
responsibilities for each SLC phase and the activities within that phase.  
The basic FSM tasks include: 
1. Defining a safety lifecycle process. Most companies are already following this type of 
process for each safety system project. All that is usually still needed is to summarize the 
complete process, lay out the required inputs and outputs of each safety lifecycle phase so 
that everything is consistent, and adjust timing of some activities to provide inputs in a 
timely manner. 
2. Developing a functional safety management procedure. For most companies, this will 
basically be the safety system installation's reference document. It will list the general 
installation structure - naming each of the safety lifecycle steps, identify the guidance 
documents that apply, establish roles and responsibilities, and define competency 
requirements. 
3. Develop a project execution safety plan. Competent project managers know successful 
projects begin a project with good planning and only need to expand content to address 
the functional safety requirements. An example is shown below: 
Table 1: Project Execution Safety Plan 
Functional safety management (FSM) is specifically noted to act as an extension to existing 
monitored quality systems and processes. This quality-based philosophy of “plan, execute 
according to plan, verify, document, and improve based on the resulting experience” carries 
through the entire safety lifecycle. 
1.1 FSM Issue #1: Management Must “Buy In” or the Process Will Fail 
For a manager, the compliance requirements noted in this paper should only involve a moderate 
investment in time and resources. However, they do require a strong and ongoing philosophical 
commitment since that is where the benefits really build upon each other. As with most 
procedures and methods of organizing work, one can either drown in the paperwork or use it as a 
lifeline to cost savings and other improvements. The difference will come down to how well the 
process is managed. All documentation should provide a net value or else it should not exist.  
1.2 Other FSM Issues Found in Functional Safety Management Implementation 
The biggest issue found when trying to implement FSM is that many contractors employed to 
support SIS installations did not fully understand the requirements. Hence, such projects took 
their normal design path and many of the safety lifecycle requirements were not met in their 
logical order. In such cases, costly redesigns occurred where original equipment was 
underspecified. In other situations, equipment was overspecified and more redundancy was 
procured than required. 
Another issue found in meeting FSM compliance was completing the Functional Safety 
Assessment (FSA) after installation and commissioning and just before start-up. The hardest part 
of fulfilling this requirement is timing. One user stated “No way - it will never be obtained in 
practice. How can a company go through all the preceding safety lifecycle steps while operations 
is breathing down the FSA assessor’s neck?”[1] Having a strategy already in place that plans for 
the FSA in advance and incrementally doing the earlier stages will save a project considerable 
headache resulting from damaging, last minute mandated inclusions.  
 1.3 Example of Flawed FSM Execution 
In one large installation, FSM practices were not applied in a systematic manner. After the 
facility started up, several near-misses resulted and a FSA audit team came in to review gaps. 
Since there were numerous infractions, the facility start-up was delayed for a significant period 
and deferred productions cost was estimated in the millions USD. 
 
2. Completing Thorough PHAs 
Process Hazard Assessment (PHA) follows the process design step in the functional safety 
lifecycle. New process plant design and existing facilities have included risk assessments 
associated with their unique processes for many years, it was not until 29 CFR 1910.119, Process 
Safety Management (PSM) for Highly Hazardous Chemicals [2]  that it became a formal 
requirement in the U.S. Some equivalent requirements are usually present in other parts of the 
world, but not always.  
 2.1 HAZOPs 
Most process plants use HAZOP or some variation; the key item is to make sure that there is a 
systematic way to identify all potential hazards so the risk team can determine how to manage 
each one. It is rather hard to protect against an unknown, undefined hazard. Although specialist 
advice may be required to determine which method may work best. Generally speaking, 
HAZOPs are favored for their thoroughness, since the whole plant is reviewed node-by-node, 
with a detailed set of guide words applied to each characteristic of the process. 
The main advantage of a clear, concise PHA hazard identification review is through the 
information it provides to the SIL determination process. If the PHA is done and documented 
well, then the layer of protection analysis (LOPA) can be completed more efficiently and more 
accurately.  
2.2 PHA Issues 
A publication titled "Good practice and pitfalls in risk assessment" [3] notes the following 
instances of problems that have been witnessed in the US Gulf Coast process industry: 
• Case Study 9: Not involving a team of people in the assessment/not including employees 
with practical knowledge of the process/activity being assessed 
• Case Study 10: Ineffective use of consultants' (i.e. Not insuring that the staff within a 
company have a deep understanding of the risk assessment) 
• Case Study 11: Failure to identify all relevant modes of operation' (i.e. All non-steady 
state operation modes) 
• Case Study 12: Failure to consider common cause failures' (example - Four (4) pumps 
located close to a highway that were vulnerable to being hit by a vehicle) 
• Case Study 16: Inappropriate use of generic failure data (i.e. Specific data to the product / 
application is always better for both risk analysis and safety system verification.) 
With this key activity leading the rest of the safety lifecycle practices, risk assessments should 
always be performed carefully to avoid these types of mistakes. 
 2.3 Example of Flawed PHA 
In a recent application, a truck loading node was not well defined during the design phase 
HAZOP and a temperature control failure was not captured. The second PHA revalidation team 
discovered that low temperature carbon steel piping embrittlement could result. Fortunately, the 
site had not seen such a failure, but the system was placed “out of service” until the design flaw 
was corrected. 
3. SIL Determination 
There are various graphical and numerical techniques to determine the required SIL value to 
achieve a tolerable risk. Those cited in ISA84/IEC61511 follow in Table 2.  
 
Ref Annex Name Origin 
1 A ALARP* (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) UK ** 
2 B Semi-Quantitative USA 
3 C Safety Layer Matrix USA 
4 D Calibrated Risk Graph: Semi-Qualitative UK + Finland 
5 E Risk Graph: Qualitative Germany 
6 F Layer of Protection Analysis USA 
Table 2: Comparison of different SIL Selection Methods 
Each of these methods should give roughly the same answer if they're "calibrated" to the same 
tolerable risk. The real choice in technique depends more on what fits best with a company’s 
existing risk management philosophy and procedures. For each hazard, the SIL technique must 
take into account: 
1. The corporations' tolerable limits 
2. Full and mitigated consequences of each hazard 
3. Root cause or initiating event frequency 
4. Number and effectiveness of independent safeguards 
If there's a gap between the tolerable and current hazard frequency (taking into account the 
applicable safeguards, but not the SIF), then added protection is required. It can be either a SIF 
or other layers of protection. 
 
 3.1 Issues with Combined PHA/SIL Determination 
There are “pros and cons” about whether or not the SIL determination should be done 
simultaneously with the PHA or in a separate meeting. Such a debate was documented in an 
earlier paper titled “Joint PHA & SIL Facilitation – Successful Implementation Steps”[4]. On the 
whole, it is the authors’ opinion that a combined PHA/SIL analysis can be done competently if 
the facilitator has the background in both risk identification concepts and functional safety, and 
the procedure structure supports intent. With such a background, the facilitator sees the “whole 
picture” and can efficiently utilize the PHA team to obtain key data for not only the PHA and 
SIL determination, but even go far enough to capture essential data for the SRS, PSV setpoints, 
and alarm rationalization. 
 3.2 Example where SIL Consistency was not Achieved 
One client site that applied SIL determination had results for similar compressor applications that 
ranged from SIL0 to SIL3. Another had similar results for fired heater applications.  It was found 
that the PHAs had considerable variance in consequence valuations and that each facilitator 
applied different IPL rule-sets. To reconcile the differences, the PHA and SIL determination 
teams had to reconvene which resulted in unnecessary resource cost. Management is now wary 
of the SIL determination process and the team must redeem itself on future applications.  
4. Development of the Safety Requirement Specification (SRS) for SIFs 
The safety requirements specification (SRS) is the primary reference for the remaining parts of 
the safety lifecycle. This document is especially important since it often marks the handoff of 
safety lifecycle responsibility from one company to another and is a key project communication 
document. Once these requirements are clearly laid out, they will significantly help the 
remaining design, installation, and operation phases of the safety systems lifecycle. The SRS 
addresses both functional and integrity specifications as stated below. 
4.1 SRS Functional Requirements 
The functional part of the SRS describes what the safety instrumented function does when harm 
from a given hazard is imminent. Required details include process inputs and their trip set-points, 
safety system outputs and their actions, and the logical relationship between each of them. This 
is a similar requirement for any control loop within the basic process control system, but in the 
SRS case, improved safety, not production, is the goal. Functional requirements that have been 
included in both editions of ISA 84 include: 
ISA 84 Clause 
Stated Functional Requirement  
1996 2004 
5.3.1 10.3.1 Defined safe state 
5.3.2&3 10.3.1 SIS process measurements and their trip points 
5.3.4 10.3.1 SIS process output actions 
5.3.5 10.3.1 The functional relationship between process inputs and outputs 
5.3.7 10.3.1 Manual shutdown detail 
5.3.6 10.3.1 Energize or de-energize to trip specification 
ISA 84 Clause Stated Functional Requirement  
5.3.8 implied Action(s) to be taken on loss of energy source(s) to the SIS 
5.3.12 10.3.1 Method to reset the SIS after a shutdown 
Table 3: SRS Functional Requirements  
4.2 SRS - Integrity Specifications  
The integrity part of the SRS describes “how well” the safety instrumented function needs to 
work when harm from a given hazard is imminent. In this part of the SRS, it must specify such 
things as the required SIL, as well as necessary diagnostics, maintenance, and testing. The 
specified integrity requirements that have been included in both editions of ISA 84 are included 
in Table 4.  
ISA 84 Clause 
Stated Integrity Requirement 
1996 2004 
5.4.3 10.3.1 Proof test intervals 
5.3 10.3.1 Response time for the SIS to bring process to safe state 
5.4.1 10.3.1 SIL & operational demand mode (demand or continuous) 
5.4.4 10.3.1 Maximum allowable spurious trip rate 
5.3.10 10.3.1 Failure modes & desired response of the SIS (alarms, auto s/d) 
5.3.11 10.3.1 All interfaces between the SIS and any other system (BPCS, ops) 
7.7 10.3.1 The extremes of all SIS environmental conditions 
5.4.2 implied Requirements for diagnostics to achieve the required SIL 
Table 4: SRS Integrity Requirements  
4.3 SRS Pitfalls 
There are multiple faults that can creep into a good SRS. Several include: 
• Issues could start with the input where the SIL determination team may have been given 
a poorly executed PHA as an input 
• Problem with SRS documentation control which include when it: 
o Is out of date because it was not maintained 
o Has no revision control 
o Is missing important requirements. 
Having a “living” SRS and competent implementers overcomes such issues. 
4.4 Examples of Flawed SRS Documentation  
As might be expected, there are a number of frightening real life examples of SRS problems. 
Some direct quotes from system integrators [1] include the cases where: 
1. "Change notes were verbally coming in, often by phone." 
2. "Two companies sat down to go over their released-for-fabrication drawings, which were 
fully signed off, but the two sets of drawings were different." 
3. “The SRS gaps that we regularly witness are where no function test intervals, test 
facilities, or spurious trip requirements are specified.” 
It is for these reasons that a project team may want to incorporate a Functional Safety 
Assessment (FSA) at this point in the lifecycle to ensure that adequate information is available 
for design, especially for those critical SIL2 & SIL3 applications. 
5. Confirm the SIF Conceptual Designs 
The SIS conceptual design step involves taking the preliminary SIF list based on the SRS and 
investigating each SIFs makeup. Associated SIF components, voting configuration, and testing 
plan for each SIF are confirmed before being used in the SIL verification calculations. 
 5.1 Conceptual Design Issues 
It is surprising how much time is required by a functional safety engineer (FSE) to validate a 
SIF’s conceptual design. Why? The problem is three-fold. First, the PHA hazard scenario is 
stated so vaguely that even the process engineer has a hard time specifying what is required to 
get to the safe state when reading the PHA post-facto. When reviewing cause and effects, a 
myriad of actions may be listed, but not all are required to remedy the hazard scenario as stated. 
It is paramount to get the sensing and actions correct to meet stringent SIL requirements. Any 
excesses will either not meet the SIL requirement or will become a burden for the maintenance 
phase of the safety lifecycle. 
The second problematic issue with SIF conceptual design is accounting for all the components 
involved to meet the SIL target. In many cases, critical loops that have been verified using 
simplistic models are found deficient when all the mechanical and electrical diagrams have been 
reviewed. Interface components, especially non-SIL rated and programmed devices, could 
deliver one SIL level lower than what was originally thought true. It is always prudent to do SIF 
conceptual design homework upfront and accurately reflect the design intent in the models. 
Finally, is the proposed SIF fully independent of the initiating cause and other IPLs? Care should 
always be included in designs that involve control valves since they normally involve some level 
of common cause. Such issues are compounded if the facilitator and team for the SIL 
determination session do not fully understand IPL requirements or mis-apply IPL credits. In 
other cases, the PHA team as a whole may not have addressed all causes and in such cases the 
concept design engineer must be familiar enough with the process to diagnose such issues.  
 5.2 Example of Flawed Conceptual Design  
In a recent project, turbomachinery SIFs were being evaluated for a SIL2 application. All was 
thought to be fine since the system included SIL3 components for the sensors and logic solver 
and the final element was partial stroke tested. Unfortunately, late in the design cycle, an 
emergency trip device was discovered in the mechanical drawings that was critical to the SIF 
since it acted as an interface component for dumping the hydraulic power fluid. . The design 
team found an alternative solution to avoid adding an inline steam valve (estimated at $300k), 
but not every team is so fortunate. 
 
 
6. SIL Verification Calculations (“Testing the Metal” of SIFs) 
Each safety instrumented function (SIF) design must now be verified through probabilistic 
calculations. (See Clause 11.9.1) The key here is to do the probabilistic calculations for each SIF 
which will verify safety and spurious trip performance criteria as well as optimize design to 
economically meet the requirements for each different function. The spurious trip discovery 
could be quite significant for plant production where it has been stated that up to 18% of plant 
trips are associated with instrumentation. 
Verification calculations are performed after the other conceptual design steps have been 
completed at draft level. (See Safety Instrumented Systems Verification -Practical Probabilistic 
Calculations [6] for more information on this subject.)  If calculations show that the draft design 
does not meet the SIL target, the choices are: 
1. Shorten the testing interval, but not beyond the practical point for operations 
2. Select better technology/equipment. 
3. Add redundancy or other IPLs  
The conceptual design iterations will continue until the SIL or risk reduction target is met with 
the overall most economical system.  
6.1 Issue #1 with Performing SIL Verification - Data 
Finding data is a big issue in completing SIL calculations. If site generated data was available, 
naturally that would be the best option. In its absence, there are several industry databases being 
published by organizations like OREDA, AIChE, IEEE and others. This data often provides a 
total failure rate for an instrument type, but does not detail conditions or modes of failure.  While 
the data in industry databases is not product specific or application specific, it does provide 
useful failure rate information especially for comparison purposes.  
Another choice is utilizing “Failure Modes Effects and Diagnostic Analysis” data. This 
technique has been developed many years ago [6] specifically to obtain data needed for SIF 
verification calculations. A FMEDA is done by examining each component in a product. For 
each failure mode of each component, the effect on the product is recorded. The process is 
extremely detailed and systematic. FMEDA results can provide instrument specific failure rate 
data that can be far more accurate than generic database information. The method depends on 
electronic and mechanical component data [7] for its accuracy so it is important that the data be 
calibrated for the process industry environment. This is done by comparing results to actual field 
failure data [8].  
6.2 Issue #2 with Performing SIL Verification - Meeting all SIL Requirements 
Besides SIL (i.e. PFDavg) calculations, each safety function must meet a minimum hardware 
fault tolerance (HFT) based on the target SIL requirement listed in the architectural constraint 
table (11.4.1). This design element was included to provide an extra layer of protection to 
address the uncertainty in the failure rate of the various system components.  
For example, the table from ISA 84.00.01-2004 shown below is used for field devices. 
Table 5: Architectural Constraints for End Devices 
Using this table for a SIL2 target, the design must use at least two final elements in a dangerous 
failure tolerant configuration (i.e. 1oo2) even if SIL verification results show an overall PFDavg 
of SIL2 with only 1 device is achieved. 
One additional requirement is based on using “assessed” devices as safety components so that 
vender systematic flaws are minimized.  Devices that are either certified to IEC 61508 or based 
on user "prior use" (Clause11.5.3) must be used to meet this requirement. Many functional safety 
engineers (FSEs) will choose certified components just because they don’t have a good device 
reliability database and the certified equipment comes with its own approved data. Either choice 
will require “usability” judgment based upon current installation time accumulated and specific 
application details. 
 6.3 Example on Value of FMEDA Derived Data 
Many trusted devices lack certification and “prior use” justification is cumbersome. For example 
in steam turbine applications, data is rarely available for the trip and throttle valve. Rather than 
assume conservative data, one organization elected to perform a FMEDA on the device. Results 
supported a SIL2 attainment when using partial stroke testing and accounting for specific 
overspeed failure modes where a significant leak was required to fit the scenario stated. 
7.  Proof Testing Practices 
Since OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Management covered many of the operations and 
maintenance requirements, most companies are performing some level of tests. For many, the 
test is a full functional test from the sensor to the final device done a periodic basis that aligns 
with their scheduled shutdowns.  
While this is still considered good practice, there may be benefits employed by utilizing 
upgraded diagnostic methods that are less invasive on the process. Given the capabilities of 
safety certified instrumentation, many of the functional proof test methods developed for relays 
and pneumatic instruments is not only less effective but very costly compared to more 
appropriate methods. 
7.1 Proof Test Practice Issues 
The biggest issue with proof testing is that no methods have 100% coverage of dangerous 
failures. To account for this discrepancy, replacement or “rebuild to new” (i.e. mission times) 
now must be specified for all equipment and they must be within the useful life of the 
component. 
The second issue discovered when reviewing site test practices is that most procedures included 
the full functional test, but testing of the diagnostic routines was not completed. Since the 









Special requirements apply (see IEC 61508)
SIL Minimum hardware fault tolerance
account for detection of faults, degraded failure architecture, and presentation of associated 
alarms. 
 7.2 Example of Optimized Proof Test Practice and Maintenance 
As discussed in 7.1, no proof tests are 100% effective in detecting all covert faults. Due to such a 
limitation, turbomachinery specialists in one corporation inherently understood this issue and 
have been rebuilding their critical trip and throttle valves in every turnaround for years. This 
level of maintenance, coupled with optimized partial stroke testing techniques, has helped each 
site meet their SIL2 safety and production goals simultaneously. 
Conclusion - Benefits of Following Compliance Plan 
Executing an optimum functional safety plan will help the facility in multiple ways. A few 
extracted benefits from “Win/Win: A Manager’s Guide to Functional Safety”, include: 
1. Lowering the cost of spurious trips by uncovering reliability issues 
2. Proper front equipment selection and minimizing “overspecification” costs 
3. More precise “realistic” PHA (Process Hazard Reviews) 
4. A decrease in "specification errors" and resulting accidents 
5. Universal, world-wide process standard efficiencies 
6. Optimized proof test intervals 
7. Impacts of production and corporate image losses can be quantified and included for a 
more accurate analysis 
Thus each of these additive bottom line benefits, coupled with increased functional safety, can 
help justify the full ISA 84-2004 approach and make it a “journey worth taking”. Try weighting 
them, putting in corporate estimates for both costs (spurious trips and different accident 
scenarios) and gains (manpower efficiency and production), and see if they result in good news 
to present to the senior management team. 
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